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PETER K. Yu 1
In November 2001, member states of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") approved the proposal to admit China to the
international trading body in the Doha Ministerial Conference.2 After
fifteen years of exhaustive negotiations, China formally became the
143rd member of the WTO on December 11, 2001. To reflect on this
event and to explore its ramifications, this panel brings together a wide
variety of experts. We have optimists and pessimists; inside experts
and outside specialists; academics, government officials, and legal
practitioners.
When commentators analyze the effects of China's entry into
the WTO, they usually fall into one of two camps-the optimists or
the pessimists--or a hybrid between the two, which considers China's
entry a "double-edged sword."3
The optimists maintain that China's entry will benefit not only
China, but also the global community. As they explain, the
international trading system can ill afford to have a player as major as
China not playing by the rules of the game. Involving China in the
WTO and obtaining deadlines for compliance therefore is preferable to
having China outside the organization with no deadlines whatsoever.
China also may be more inclined to adhere to those international
norms that it helps to shape.
Moreover, according to the optimists, China's WTO
membership will benefit its local people by lowering prices through
competition, by enabling a more efficient operation of the Chinese
economy, and by integrating the country into the global community. It
also will create new jobs, attract foreign investment, acquire human
talents, and provide the capital needed for the country's modernization
efforts.
Professor Yu's remarks were revised from Peter K. Yu, The Ramifications of China's Entry into
the WTO: Will the Global Community Benefit?, FNDLAW'S WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY, Dec. 4,
2001, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20011204_yu.html.
2 Paul Blustein & Clay Chandler, WTO Approves China's Entry, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2001, at
A47; Joseph Kahn, World Trade Organization Admits China, Amid Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
2001, at IA.
3 For discussions of China's entry into the WTO, see generally GORDON G. CHANG, THE COMING
COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001); NICHOLAS R. LARDY, INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (2002); PETER NOLAN, CHINA AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: NATIONAL CHAMPIONS,
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND THE BIG BUSINESS REVOLUTION (2001); SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI &
MARK CLIFFORD, CHINA AND THE WTO: CHANGING CHINA, CHANGING WORLD TRADE (2002).
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In addition, the optimists say, China's entry will promote the
rule of law in the country, undercut the power of the state to control
the lives of its citizens, and accelerate China's transition from a
command economy to a market economy. The WTO membership also
will help modernize the accounting, banking, legal,
telecommunications, and transportation systems, while at the same
time reducing corruption, favoritism, and local protectionism.
By contrast, the pessimists contend that China's accession to
the WTO may disrupt the global trading system. As they point out,
China has a poor record of fulfilling international obligations. And if
China's rogue state mentality continues despite its joining the WTO,
its actions eventually may result in the collapse of the organization.
After all, the WTO is already under siege-facing severe
criticism by less developed countries and heightened media scrutiny
since the violent protests in Seattle and Genoa. China's irresponsible
behavior, the pessimists say, could cause other member states to lose
confidence in the already-fragile global trading system.
Whether one belongs to the optimists' or the pessimists' camp
will depend on one's confidence in China's ability to honor promises
and to fulfill treaty obligations.
Pessimists generally cite two basic reasons to explain why
China will fail to abide by the WTO rules. First, China might prefer to
compete unfairly against other WTO members by free-riding on the
benefits of the global trading system. Second, China's socio-economic
problems may be so severe that the Chinese leaders will not be able to
honor their promises even if they want to do so. Given Chinese
leadership's strong desire to minimize friction with other WTO
member states, the latter explanation is more likely than the former to
account for China's future reckless behavior.
Since the reopening of China in the late 1970s, China's
economy has been growing at an enviable average annual rate of about
seven percent. Unfortunately, this rapid economic growth has brought
about serious domestic problems. These problems include decreasing
control by the state, decentralization of the central government,
significant losses suffered by inefficient state-owned enterprises, the
widening gap between the rich and the poor and between the urban and
rural areas, massive urban migration, widespread unemployment,
corruption, and growing unrest in both the cities and the countryside.
With the opening of China's market to foreign competition,
these problems will likely be exacerbated. For example, the
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streamlining, restructuring, and closure of state-owned enterprises may
lead to massive layoffs while automation and high-technology
equipment may also contribute to a socially disruptive transformation
of labor-intensive industries. As a result, the Chinese economy will
undergo major structural changes, and tens of millions of farmers and
workers may lose their jobs over the next five years.
This daunting array of domestic problems will become even
more important in light of the recent retirement of third-generation
Chinese leaders, including Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, and Li Peng,
which could spark an internal battle over leadership succession. To
gain political capital, conservative hardliners may use the domestic
problems caused by China's entry into the WTO to discredit their
reformist counterparts. Meanwhile, reformist leaders may take a
cautious approach and put off difficult and risky policies until they can
consolidate their political power. Under such a political climate,
reforms-including those that are needed for China's transition
efforts-will likely slow down, if they continue at all.
Furthermore, the WTO membership may bring about changes
that redefine the way people conduct business, achieve success, and
obtain power in China. While foreign businesspeople are generally
frustrated by the lack of rules and certainty in China's business
environment, many local Chinese entrepreneurs have been very
successful and are able to master the rules of the game, conquer the
bureaucratic maze, and develop guanxi (personal connections) which
enable them to prosper in society.
However, with the introduction of new rules required under the
WTO, these people may have to play a different game-a game that is
new, unfamiliar, and very different from the one they have mastered.
Even worse, many of them may have difficulty in adjusting to the new
system and thus will suffer from reduced income, lower career
satisfaction, and deteriorating living conditions. As a result, many of
those who have prospered under the existing system will find the new
system unappealing, or even irritating. Dissatisfied by the new system,
the public may seriously question the legitimacy of the reforms-and
perhaps the Chinese Communist Party's leadership-and social unrest
might become widespread.
4 Erik Eckholm, China's President Steps Down to Make Way for New Generation, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2002, at A10; Erik Eckholm, Change in China: The Transition; China Carries Out an
Orderly Shift oflts Leadership, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at Al.
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Finally, to provide social control and curtail instability in light
of the challenges posed by China's accession to the WTO, the Chinese
authorities may adopt harsh policies and draconian measures that
undermine civil liberties and human rights. The authorities also may
tighten their information control policy to minimize criticism of the
government and to reduce channels through which people can voice
their grievances.
In the next five years, China will face significant challenges as
it makes its transition to a new regime under the WTO. Combined with
existing socio-economic problems, these challenges will make the
transitional period critical.
If, despite these challenges, China can remain stable and
overcome the short-term hardships created by its entry into the WTO,
joining the organization will benefit the country. China's WTO
membership also will benefit the international community, for it will
likely induce China to become a team player in that community.
However, if China fails to cope with its upcoming challenges,
the country may suffer setbacks that have the potential to erase the
progress China has made in the past two decades. Under this scenario,
the conservative leaders may replace their reformist counterparts, and
China may retreat into a new kind of isolationism.
In addition, the Chinese may blame Western developed
countries and the international global trading system for the country's
failure to modernize. There may also emerge new forms of nationalism
and xenophobia that are more radical than those we saw shortly after
the 1999 U.S. bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade or after the
2001 standoff over the collision between a Chinese jet fighter and a
U.S. reconnaissance plane.
In sum, the future prospects of China's entry into the WTO
remain uncertain, and many questions have yet to be answered. Will
China be a team player or a rogue state? Will China keep its promises,
comply with deadlines, and fulfill its treaty obligations? Will China
play an active role in future WTO rounds of talks? Will China take an
active stance in setting the new international trade agenda? Will
China's WTO membership give Asian countries greater bargaining
power within the international trading body? Will China create tension
within the WTO by alienating those less developed countries that have
to compete with China for foreign direct investment and export
markets? There are no easy answers to these questions. It depends on
whom you ask.
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GORDON G. CHANG
Is China's economy changing? Yes, of course. But is it
reforming? Well, that is not so clear. And is China booming?
There is no question that China changed, reformed, and
boomed up until five years ago. But what about the last half decade?
This is where many China watchers get it wrong. They see all the
progress in the first part of the reform era, and they just assume that it
has continued after the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997.
So we really need to take a look at what is happening today.
The change that we see today is more the product of creative
destruction than conscious reform. And when the central government
does act, we often see retreat, not advance. Structural economic reform
is running aground in the People's Republic of China.
During the era of Deng Xiaoping, the economy of China was
transformed from a socialist command system to a mixed one. Deng
believed in what I call the Nike school of economic restructuring: his
motto was, "Just Do It." And as a result, China's economy grew
extremely fast, perhaps the fastest in the world and maybe even the
fastest in world history. Change was exhilarating.
In the past half decade, however, the story has been different.
We have heard a lot of talk of reform and we have even seen some
change, but there has been relatively little progress. Under Jiang
Zemin and Hu Jintao, gradualism has been the rule, and every once in
a while we have even seen backsliding, as if that were an option.
Backsliding is not an option because China is already in the
WTO, and in the next few years the worst effects of accession will be
felt. Generally speaking, the country could benefit from being in the
global trading body. But that is only in the long term after structural
reform has had an opportunity to take effect. In the meantime there is
going to be pain. There are going to be more business failures, more
layoffs, and more social unrest. And that is inevitable, because China
is trying to cure more than five decades of economic mismanagement
with the shock therapy of the WTO.
Let us get specific about the WTO. The best way to do that is
to look at the facts. Mao Zedong, for all his faults, left China with a
solvent banking system. There were no non-performing loans. But
during the reform era, and especially in the past decade, China's banks
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have become sick, perhaps the sickest in the world. How in the world
did that happen?
The state's first priority was to fix state-owned enterprises, so
grants from the central government were replaced with loans from
state banks. In theory, this was sound-make the wheezing state
enterprises self-sufficient. But in practice, this was a disaster. State
enterprises knew they did not have to pay back the state banks, so they
did not. And in an economic system divorced from economic reality,
the banks became gift-givers. State banks vacuumed up cash from
hundreds of millions of individual depositors and disgorged it onto
hundreds of thousands of state-owned enterprises.
The big news in China's banking system is not how weak the
banks are today. It is the ongoing creation of new bad loans.
Communist Party and central government officials see the state banks
as a "secondary budget," in other words, a convenient source of
funding. So the state banks fund state enterprises and they even fund
the state itself. A large portion of the central government's finances are
covered by the proceeds of sovereign treasury issues, and state banks
obediently buy these obligations as they come to the market. When the
state banks run out of cash because of their purchases of central
government debt, the central bank tides them over with interim
funding. So money is circulating in a closed system with many parts of
the state financing each other at the same time.
Because this appalling state of affairs could not last
indefinitely, Beijing formed four asset management companies
("AMCs") to absorb a portion of the bad debt of the four largest state
banks. The AMC plan, however, is itself failing, and the AMCs now
need bailouts.
Beijing is merely passing the problem from one group of state
entities to another: from the state-owned enterprises to the state-owned
banks and from the state-owned banks to the state-owned AMCs. The
aftershocks of a banking crisis will last years, even if a government
acts decisively. When it does not, the crisis will persist indefinitely.
And that appears to be China's fate because there is no apparent end to
the problems. This dreadful state of affairs was caused by the
reformers, and now they have run out of ideas as to what to do.
Here is the final irony. The AMCs are weakening the central
bank because they are not paying interest to it. Now there is talk that
the central bank itself needs a bailout. This situation would be comical
if the implications for China were not so serious.
2003]
COL UMBIA JOURNAL OF ASIAN LA W
In China, we have seen the central government devote
substantial time and resources to fixing the state banks, but let us not
mistake activity for progress or the talk of reform for reform itself. It is
certainly not beyond central government officials to waste even more
time. But they cannot afford to do that because the WTO provides a
hard deadline for structural reform. Sometime between now and 2007,
when the foreign banks get full access to domestic markets, Beijing
must come up with something like a half-trillion U.S. dollars to fix the
state banks. If it does not, the next crisis in the banking system could
be of historic proportions.
The central government is talking about privatization for the
state banks in the next few years, but given their massive bad loan
problem and other factors, it is unrealistic to think that foreign
investors will be interested. Will domestic investors buy? Perhaps,
but to answer that question we should first look at the complicated
politics of privatization in China today. And to do that, we need to
examine Beijing's repeated attempts to fund the nation's bankrupt
social welfare system through stock sales. But first, we need a little
background.
We did not have to wait too long after WTO accession to see
massive worker protests, which rocked China from one end to the
other but especially in the troubled northeast and especially in the
cities of Daqing and Liaoyang. In March 2002 these cities saw protests
of 30,000, 40,000, and perhaps 50,000 workers. But what brought the
laborers out into the streets?
The central government essentially forced state-owned
enterprises to shed tens of millions of workers in the run-up to WTO
accession without providing an adequate social safety net.
The failure to do so typifies the breakdown of reform in China
today. Senior leaders in Beijing are so proud of the national social
security system that they put together in the middle of the last decade.
But this program suffers from an improbable combination. On the one
hand, it exists mostly on paper, and on the other hand, it is in tatters
and on the verge of bankruptcy. Beijing will have to come up with one
trillion U.S. dollars, give or take several hundred billion dollars, in
order to fund pensions and other social welfare benefits. In order to do
this, central government technocrats devised a plan that should have
worked: selling more stock of state-owned enterprises. The state
controls a majority of the shares of the companies that are listed on
China's two domestic exchanges, one in Shanghai and the other in
[17:1
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Shenzhen. State media tells us the percentage of state-owned stock of
these companies is as high as sixty-five to seventy percent.
In June 2001, the central government announced its plan to
fund pensions and severance benefits. Those enterprises listing their
shares for the first time would have to put a small portion of the
proceeds of the listings into the National Social Security Fund.
Immediately upon the announcement of the plan, the markets sank.
They lost about thirty percent of their value, about US$181 billion in
market capitalization. Existing investors were worried that a flood of
new shares would depress the value of what they already owned. So, in
October of that year the central government withdrew the plan, and the
markets came right back up.
Although reversing course did a lot for share prices, it did
nothing to solve the underlying problems of funding pensions and
severance benefits. In January 2002, the central government
announced another plan, and again the markets sank, and again the
central government withdrew its plan, and the markets came back up.
This time, the officials waited only two days to withdraw the plan.
The insolvency of the system does not seem to be worrying the
technocrats in Beijing because in June 2002 they announced a
permanent abandonment of their plan to fund the social security
system. Since then there has been no apparent progress towards
repairing the system. If the technocrats in the Chinese capital cannot
fund their social security system through stock sales when funding is
critical to maintaining social stability, how can they recapitalize the
banks in the same way?
The country is either going to have a funded social security
system and solvent banks or it is going to have a new government. The
choice is entirely in Beijing's hands, and so far it cannot come up with
the right answer.
These days we know that China cannot come up with any
answers, and the reason is that the country is involved in an important
political transition as the third generation of leaders makes way for the
fourth. Almost all the top posts in the Communist Party and in the
central government changed hands recently. In the ludicrous political
system that Beijing maintains, very little gets done during periods of
political transition. Because Jiang Zemin does not want to leave the
scene, the current transition could last years.
2003]
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In this time of political transition the leaders prefer the easy
solutions. What they like to do is spend money, hoping to get by from
one day to the next without fixing the real problems.
What do I mean? I think we need to go behind the headlines to
see what actually has happened. It is true that the vital signs of the
economy are improving. In 2001, growth of gross domestic product
was 7.3 percent. In 2002, it was eight percent. If central government
predictions are correct, and of course they always are, we are going to
see at least 8.5 percent growth for 2003.
Now, that looks great, but that is not the real story. The real
story is what we are not seeing. We are not seeing the end, or even the
tapering-off, of the government's program of massive fiscal stimulus.
Sure, China has vibrant private and export sectors basically
concentrated along the coast, but the rest of the economy, the state
sector, is ailing, or at best, stagnant.
China started its program of government stimulus in 1998 and
has promised an end to it many times. The program, however,
continues today. In the third quarter of 2003 fixed asset investment
increased by an astounding 30.5 percent. The acceleration of pump
priming means one thing: the economy is not able to grow on its own.
China watchers today are involved in this very lively debate
about whether the central government has been doctoring its numbers.
But we do not really need to know whether it has, and we do not even
really need to know what the underlying growth rate is. What we need
to know is what we can see with our own eyes: China is just buying
low quality growth. The central government accounts for more than
two-thirds of investment in the country, and that is alarming by any
standard. Central government spending is inefficient: fiscal stimulus is
increasing more than three times faster than the economy. In other
words, they are destroying money in the Chinese capital today.
So we have to ask ourselves a simple question: What is going
to happen when the central government can no longer afford its
program of fiscal stimulus?
Even at this late date, central government leaders cannot figure
out what to do. The system that we see is losing the ability to change
itself from within.
On the surface, the problems of the People's Republic appear
to be economic, yet the real problem is the political system, which
does not allow the implementation of even the obvious solutions. And
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in this period of political transition, the paralysis will be even more
apparent.
Today we see that central government leaders have no exit
strategy. They continue with policies they know do not work because
they cannot afford the long-term solutions. A half-decade ago, they
had real choices. Today, the leaders do not. They are running out of
room to maneuver, and they are running out of time.
JEROME A. COHEN
I think today's overall slogan should be "Let a Hundred
Flowers Bloom," because you will hear many different views about
this important and fascinating subject. I am going to talk about the
legal system and the implications of joining the WTO for China's legal
system.
I gave a talk in 2001 at the U.S.-China Security Review
Commission, which you can find on the Internet. 5 1 think the talk is
also published in Chinese in China and in English here. But let me just
summarize what the requirements are for China's legal system. I am
not going to talk about substance now-intellectual property
protection or the treatment of different products, or even the treatment
of lawyers in China-although I hope somebody will touch upon
China's fulfillment of its obligation to foreign lawyers.
What I want to talk about is the institutional arrangements after
the WTO. Now there are essentially three demands the WTO makes on
the legal system. One is transparency. We have to do away with
internal documents. They are supposed to publish all relevant
regulations-not just laws and regulations, but also legal decisions and
other relevant norms. And, if they are not published, you are not
supposed to be bound by them. It is that important. And before they
are promulgated, you are supposed to have an opportunity to comment
on the proposed regulations, laws, or what have you. That is a tall
order for China. I think a good deal of progress is being made toward
that goal, but it is not going to be simple to meet the standard.
The second fundamental demand of the WTO is going to be
hard: there should no longer be arbitrary administrative actions, such
as local protectionism.
5 Jerome A. Cohen, Opening Statement Before the First Public Hearing of the U.S.-China
Commission (June 14, 2001), available at http://www.uscc.gov/tescoh.htm.
2003]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ASIAN LAW
Third, maybe the most difficult (and probably of most interest
to lawyers), there have to be some independent institutions for
reviewing challenges to administrative actions, so that if a foreign
company or businessperson complains that there is arbitrary
administrative action relating to, for example, the denial of a business
license, there is an independent institution that will impartially review
the claim that the action taken or not taken was arbitrary.
Most people assume that means there would have to be an
independent judicial institution. That is not necessarily the case. In
most instances, there could be a new kind of administrative agency.
Even the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
might pass muster in this regard, under the law and legislation that was
enacted in March 2000. But essentially, we are talking about the
courts. And the Supreme Court in China wants us to talk about the
courts. They do not want to yield any turf. They want to expand their
turf, expand their competence, here, as in most instances.
The other night I had to give a talk about a movie many of you
have seen, Qiu Ju Da Guan Si.6 I had not seen that movie for a few
years since it first came to the New York Film Festival. And when I
saw it this time, in the light of our concern about the WTO, I saw it in
a new light. That movie is really about judicial review of
administrative actions. After all, there was a decision following a
failed mediation by the Public Security Bureau, and Qiu Ju got to the
provincial court. It is not really clear what level of court it was. It
looks like it was probably a basic court that was appealed through an
intermediate court. But it is clear that her lawyer was using, she did
not realize, the Administrative Litigation Law, which went into effect
in 1990, to get judicial review of actions taken by the Public Security
Bureau.
In the 1980s, a number of separate Chinese laws provided for
judicial review. In principle at least, if you did not like the
determination of your tax liability, you could appeal that decision to
the court. Even the Security Administration Regulations for Minor
Offenses, similar to what we might call misdemeanors, provided for
the kind of review that Qiu Ju actually attained in the movie. But it
was not until 1990, when the Administrative Litigation Law went into
effect, that China began a generalized review of administrative actions
in court.
6 THE STORY OF Qiu JU (Sony Pictures 1992).
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Now, the problem is, of course: What does this mean? And
what is the scope of judicial review? Under the Administrative
Litigation Law, a review is very narrow in scope. Courts can review
concrete, specific actions, but not so-called abstract actions. That
narrows down what they can intervene in the administration for. Under
the WTO, it would seem that Chinese legislation should be amended to
broaden the scope of judicial review so that more and more
administrative actions, whether abstract or concrete, can be reviewed.
I just came back from a couple of months in China, and my
impression was that there is quite a fierce debate over this issue. Many
academics, and even scholars within the Supreme Court and research
apparatus, seem to think the law must be revised in accordance with
the WTO to expand the jurisdiction of the courts. But the people in
charge of the courts, especially the Administrative Division of the
Supreme Court, do not seem very moved by this. They do not seem to
think that this is one of the most important issues, despite the fact that
China has been revising hundreds and hundreds of laws and
regulations. They do not seem willing to recognize that some change
ought to be made.
Whatever the scope of judicial review, we have to ask: Do the
courts in China meet the WTO standard of requiring an independent,
impartial adjudicative body to review arbitrary actions by officials?
And this is where China is going to have a hard time meeting the
standard, because, if you look at the courts, you have problems of
competence. Those are gradually being solved by China's very quickly
evolving system of legal education. But you have problems of local
protectionism, and they are very, very severe, because of the way
judges are appointed, promoted, paid, and fired-locally by and large.
Even the Qing Dynasty was better than this. They had
centralized control of the appointment process, and they tried to limit
what we now call local protectionism by not sending a magistrate to
his home area and not keeping him in any place that he was assigned
for more than three years. Now, you have party control, political
control. And you have guanxi-the network of entanglements that
Chinese society so prominently features-which may be the worst of
all the problems. And of course corruption is a very serious problem.
Now every year, when I read the report of the President of the
Supreme Court, he recognizes all these problems very, very frankly.
But where he is weak is on solutions. And it is not because he lacks the
brainpower or understanding. It is because he lacks the political power.
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China needs real institutional reform. The question is: Will the new
leadership under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiaobao give the legal system real
institutional reform? Not just the kind of moderate and insignificant
changes that so far have been what they are focusing on. Will they
give institutional change high priority?
So far, the Party has given high priority-but not sufficient
priority-to reforms of the banking systems, state or enterprise reform,
taxation reform-all questions that Gordon has pointed out need to be
addressed. But they do not seem to understand that, without real
institutional reform creating an independent legal system, they are not
going to succeed to a considerable extent in any of these other
economic reforms. And China needs more foreign finances. China
needs more economic cooperation. And it is being held back despite
the tremendous success relative to other countries in achieving and
attracting foreign investors. It is still significantly being held back by
the absence of a good legal system. Now, there is the problem in
China.
I am excited by the debates in the academic circles, which
sometimes even involve judges and prosecutors. They are talking
about the need for a revolution. They do not mean violent revolution.
They mean peaceful revolution. But a revolution that really will make
some significant changes in the institutional structure, particularly with
respect to the legal system. Now, what has happened? I do not see in
the new leadership anybody who is going to make law the kind of
priority I think it deserves in Chinese life. I think those who write the
securities system so far have not shown the sensitivity to the kind of
considerations I am referring to.
On the other hand, we have to remember, nobody knew what
Khruschchev was going to do when Khruschchev took over after
Stalin died. Nobody realized he was going to try to have the Soviet
Union engage in de-Stalinization. Nobody knew what Gorbachev was
going to do when he became the number one honcho. And it is only
when somebody achieves power at the top of the Chinese system that
he may be free to say things that he did not feel he could say as
number five, or four, or three, or two. But I am not optimistic that we
will see that kind of institutional reform.
What we are more likely to see stimulated by the WTO is an
increase in legal learning. For a while, the Chinese Supreme Court was
under the impression that every judge in China had to be a WTO
expert. Of course, that is impossible. In the United States, it is a rare
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judge who knows anything at all about the WTO. What they have to
know is how their own government's legislation and regulations have
translated the WTO obligations into domestic law. And that may help
the Chinese judiciary understand its needs. So I think we are going to
see some more progress, but it is going to be progress around the
edges, rather than fundamental legal reform.
ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY
It is really a pleasure to be part of such a distinguished panel
this evening, and I do want to thank Peter for this opportunity. I am
going to focus my remarks this evening on the social, bureaucratic,
and environmental pressures that are confronting China as it attempts
to meet its WTO obligations and take advantage of WTO
opportunities.
The most obvious challenge, which Gordon has already
touched on, is that China's participation in the WTO is going to
exacerbate the already significant problem of the rural and urban
unemployed. Foreign competition and the ongoing effort to close
down, merge, and reform state-owned enterprises are expected to
generate significant numbers of newly unemployed. Foreign
competition in the agricultural sector, too, is going to lead to millions
of displaced farmers. There is no agreement among experts as to
precisely how large this impact is going to be even though official
Chinese estimates are grim. The 2002 estimates of the level of
unemployment in China already range from about four percent to
about ten percent. Looking toward the future, the Ministry of
Agriculture, for example, predicts that about twenty million people in
rural areas alone will lose their jobs because of China's WTO
accession. The U.S. Investment Bank Salomon Smith Barney has
predicted that over the next five years, as many as forty million jobs
will be lost. And over all, the State Council's Development Research
Center expects unemployment to increase from the current rate of ten
percent to fifteen percent because of the WTO.
Not surprisingly, China's leaders are alarmed by such statistics.
As Gordon mentioned, they have already been confronting frequent
large-scale protests throughout rural China and, in particular, in the
urban northeast. And now they face the specter of growing social
unrest. At the same time, there is a possibility that migrant workers,
who already make up between twenty-five to thirty-three percent of
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the population in some major cities, will come into increasing conflict
with laid-off state-owned enterprise workers.
Thus far, migrant workers have integrated with relative ease
into the burgeoning economies of the costal provinces, but I think we
are going to see growing competition and conflict between migrant
workers and state-owned enterprise workers as they compete for the
same relatively low-level, low-paying positions. There was one case,
for example, in Jilin Province, in which migrant workers dominated
the pedicab business, but local officials, perhaps in response to a
downturn in the economy, began to increase the price of the permits
that the migrant workers needed to operate the pedicabs, in order to
force them out and make the jobs available to local citizens. The result
was significant protests by the migrant workers. In the future, I think
we may see much more of this on a much larger scale.
At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that social
unrest as a result of unemployment may not be tied directly to WTO
accession in the minds of the laid-off workers. Han Dongfeng,
China's exiled labor leader, noted that it is not that laid-off state-
owned enterprise workers are opposed to the reforms themselves. Most
people in China recognize that with WTO accession, with economic
reform, there will be layoffs, transitions, the necessity of job
retraining, etc. When workers protest, they are protesting against the
corruption and the injustice and, as Gordon mentioned, the insolvency
of the pension system that has been brought about by officials and
local enterprise leaders basically absconding with the funds that had
been set aside for retirement or unemployment assistance. As Han
comments, it is not necessarily the case that protests signal opposition
to reform and to China's participation in the WTO. Rather, they signal
opposition to the injustice and the corruption of the system. The hope,
of course, is that such social protest will put pressure on China's
leadership to develop a more corruption-free system and a workable
social security system.
A second difficulty that the top leadership faces in attempting
to meet its WTO obligations is that of bureaucratic opposition. I think
this was obvious to anyone who followed China before its accession to
the WTO. There were a number of bureaucratic actors that attempted
to block the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
from making the concessions and obligations to which it was
committing in acceding to the WTO. Now, these same bureaucracies
are rising up and trying to put up bureaucratic blockades to the actual
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implementation of China's WTO commitments. For example, the
Ministry of Information Industries has been trying to set the radiation
levels for mobile telephones at a level so high that it will effectively
block competition from the European Union. The Ministry of
Agriculture and the Ministry of Public Health also proposed
restrictions and a restrictive permit process on the import of
genetically-modified soybean products. Concern over genetically
modified foods is certainly legitimate; however, the reality is that ten
percent of the products made with soybeans that are on the market
today in China are made with genetically-modified soybeans. The
Ministry of Finance also has been attempting to establish branch
capitalization rules for foreign banks that will make it very, very
difficult for them to compete. Many Chinese economists and officials
believe that these efforts are misguided and will only delay much
needed reform and perpetuate the worst practices. However, I think
that overcoming these bureaucratic impediments is going to be very
difficult and it is going to require a forceful combination of pressure
from multinationals, the Chinese government and foreign
governments. The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation was really too weak to challenge these bureaucracies in
the post-accession period; it remains to be seen whether the Ministry
of Commerce, which replaced the Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation in the 2003 administrative reforms, will be able
counteract this bureaucratic game-playing.
Finally, I think that the environment, and by this I mean the
natural environment, is going to pose some interesting new challenges
for the Chinese government as it moves forward in implementing its
WTO commitments. On the positive side, I think there are some real
opportunities here to use international pressure to encourage China to
make important changes. The Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation formed an inter-ministerial working group that
included the State Environmental Protection Administration, the
Ministry of Agriculture, and other interested parties, to try to figure
out how to move ahead in terms of adjusting to environmental
demands that are going to be placed on China by the WTO. I assume
that this working group will continue under the auspices of the
Ministry of Commerce. With international competition, it is likely that
China will move away from grain production and intensive forestry,
both of which have been very detrimental to the environment. And that
is going to be a positive change. Also, Chinese produce and fish are
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going to face strong scrutiny. The European Union has already
rejected some poultry, shrimps, and prawns, because the Chinese
government was using a prohibited antibiotic; and tea from various
provinces has been banned because of pesticide use. So on the one
hand, the WTO is likely to be a force for positive change in China,
ensuring that its produce and other food products meet international
standards. At the same time, it is likely that some of the most highly
polluting and environmentally-degrading industries are going to
prosper under the WTO-textiles and tin mining, for example. And it
is certain that automobile use is going to skyrocket over the next five
to ten years, posing a significant challenge for air quality throughout
China. Moreover, as China moves away from domestic logging, it is
moving rapidly into other regions, such as Burma, Africa, and South
America, and exploiting forest resources there. So, there will likely be
some negative trade-offs.
Since this is primarily a legal panel, let me say that WTO
accession also has encouraged the review and publication of
environmental laws. The State Environmental Protection
Administration is now posting environmental laws on its website and
asking for commentary from the public. That is a terrific change.
In general, the social, bureaucratic, and environmental
challenges facing China in implementing its WTO commitments
successfully are significant. But let me be a little bit more positive than
Gordon, and say that I do think there is the potential for WTO
accession to make some far reaching and very positive changes to the
way that China does business, in the realms of both politics and
economics. WTO accession will open the door for private efforts to
fill societal needs and strengthen China's civil society, developing a
stronger entrepreneurial class and a higher standard of living that is
going to contribute, I am confident, to growing popular demand for
better education, a cleaner environment, and the ability to participate
more directly in the political affairs of the country. So, while there will
be significant short-term stress in the economy and in the political
system, over the long term, if China can make it through this critical
five-year period that Gordon believes will produce collapse, I think
China's accession to the WTO will contribute to transforming China in
a significant and overall positive fashion.
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I am personally very honored to be part of this panel, but I am
also particularly pleased that the WTO and human rights are going to
be put together by a conjunction, and that I can talk about those issues
together. I hope that we-those of us who are trying to bring human
rights perspectives into the trade arena-fare better than those in China
who answered the call to let a thousand flowers bloom.
I was asked to talk about recent human rights development in
the context of the WTO. However, that would be a rather short talk-
even shorter than fifteen minutes. So let me expand my topic to bring
together an outline of first year assessments of China's WTO
implementation and the relevance of key WTO structural reform
obligations to human rights.
Overall, China has committed to more than 685 trade regime
8commitments. Although some of the key commitments are to be
implemented upon accession or in the first few years, many are to be
phased in over the next fourteen years (by 2016), making ongoing
evaluation necessary. In general, most U.S. observers and interested
parties (including various government agencies and companies in a
range of sectors) acknowledge the enormously complex task China
faces in implementing its WTO commitments. For example, the U.S.
government and many business sectors have generally given China
good marks at the first year mid-year point, and refer to the significant
good-faith efforts by China, especially in implementing legislative
reviews and restructuring various government ministries and agencies.
However, the United States Trade Representative ("USTR")
reports significant problems in three specific areas: agricultural goods,
intellectual property rights enforcement, and opaque and excessive
requirements in many service sectors (e.g., capitalization requirements
beyond international norms in the insurance sector). In the area of
agriculture, the remaining problems include China's regulation of
agricultural goods produced through bio-technology, the
Professor Hom's remarks were adapted from Sharon K. Hom, China and the WTO: Year One,
CHINA RIGHTS FORUM, May 28, 2003, available at
http://iso.hrichina.org/download repository/2/SharonHom.pdf.
8 Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, available at http://www.wto.org
[hereinafter Accession Protocol]; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, REPORT OF THE WORKING
PARTY ON THE ACCESSION OF CHINA (2001), available at http://www.wto.org; USGAO, WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S COMMITMENTS TO OTHER MEMBERS (2002),
available at http://www.gao.gov.
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administration of its tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system for bulk
agricultural commodities, and the application of sanitary and
phytosanitary measures and inspection requirements. 9
At the same time, serious concerns and problems regarding
structural reform issues have been identified, e.g. lack of effective and
consistent implementation at the national and sub-national levels, lack
of transparency, lack of coordination among relevant Chinese
government ministries, and noncompliance with many specific
commitments. Many of these concerns have been addressed in high-
level bilateral discussions and during the multilateral Transitional
Review process held in late September 2002. In addition to these
discussions, WTO members, including the United States, the European
Union, and Japan have provided technical assistance and training to
the Chinese government. Chinese officials publicly recognize the
enormous challenges, and point to obstacles such as insufficient
resources, limited familiarity with WTO requirements among
government officials and SOE managers, technical translation
difficulties, and concerns about the effects of particular WTO
commitments on the domestic economy.
Here, I am not going to discuss fully the compliance efforts and
issues presented by this vast and complex process, which also
encompasses nondiscrimination and transparency commitments in
other areas, such as import regulation, agriculture, trading rights, and
industrial policies. Rather, I would like to focus on areas with
particular implications for the rule of law 10 and human rights, in
particular, China's trade and legal framework commitments on
transparency, nondiscrimination, independent review of administrative
decision-making, and uniform and impartial application of laws and
regulations.
A key WTO principle is transparency. Transparency requires
China to improve the openness of its trade regime by publishing and
9 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA'S WTO
COMPLIANCE (2002) [hereinafter USTR REPORT], available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto/02121202.htm.
10 For the limited purposes of the present discussion, I use the rule of law to reference its usage
within the WTO framework as well as the international human rights framework and to refer to a
system that features independent and impartial decision-makers, transparent and open rules that
apply uniformly to all, and a process that ensures the protection of fundamental rights and interests.
The definition and scope of what a rule of law entails also raise a number of issues, reflecting a
range of conceptions and relationships (or not) to political reforms and human rights concerns. The
spring 2003 issue of the China Rights Forum was devoted to exploring and addressing many of
these issues. For one survey study, see BARRY HAGER, THE RULE OF LAW: A LEXICON FOR POLICY
MAKERS (1999) (commissioned by the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation).
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translating information and laws, and establishing a mechanism
(enquiry points) for responding to questions and information requests
from any WTO member-foreign company or individual.
Accordingly, in January 2002, China established a WTO Enquiry and
Notification Center operated by MOFTEC's Department of WTO
Affairs, and other ministries and agencies have also established formal
or informal subject-specific enquiry points. Under the WTO, China is
required to make publicly available all national, provincial, and local
laws, regulations, and other measures related to trade in goods and
services, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, or control
of foreign exchange. " A related transparency requirement is the
provision of notice and reasonable opportunity for public comment to
affected parties before new/modified laws, regulations, or other
measures are implemented (with specified exceptions). China is also
required to provide translations in one of the official WTO languages
(English, French, or Spanish) of laws, regulations, and other measures
no later than 90 days after implementation or enforcement.
According to the USTR, Chinese ministries and agencies had a
poor record in 2002 of providing an opportunity for public comment
before new or modified laws and regulations are implemented. The
USTR reports that although the State Council issued new regulations
in December 2001 that provide for public comment on the formulation
of administrative rules and regulations, many government agencies
and ministries continue to follow their pre-accession practices. The
result is that only a small portion of laws and regulations were issued
for public comment, and the comment periods were generally too
short. In addition, translation of laws and regulations has lagged
behind promulgation, in part due to the enormous quantity involved.12
Both the lack of Chinese laws in translation and the inadequacy of
public review undercut the predictability and openness of the Chinese
business climate.
Another key WTO principle is nondiscrimination.
Nondiscrimination is a key value that informs the core principles of
WTO trade policies and of China's WTO obligations. Under the most-
favored nation ("MFN") principle, China must extend to all WTO
members the best trading privileges granted to any one member, and
must treat goods of an importing WTO member's trading partners on
equal terms with one another. Under the national treatment principle,
I Accession Protocol, supra note 8, 2.c. 1.
12 USTR REPORT, supra note 9.
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China may not treat imported foreign products and services less
favorably than domestic products and services. In adhering to this
nondiscrimination principle, China must review all of its relevant
domestic legislation, and repeal or revise any laws or regulations that
are inconsistent with WTO obligations, as well as promulgate
additional laws and regulations necessary for implementation of its
obligations.
According to the Chinese official 2002 mid-year reports, China
had completed review of relevant pre-WTO laws and regulations, and
eliminated or revised over 2300 WTO-inconsistent laws and
regulations. 13 However, MFN and national treatment obligations are
still not observed in many areas. For example, U.S. businesses have
reported that different tax bases are used to compute consumption
taxes for domestic and imported products.
14
Another area of WTO requirements concerns independent
review of administrative actions. As part of its trade regime
commitments, China agreed to establish impartial tribunals to review
decisions by government authorities entrusted with administrative
enforcement. The review procedures must include a right of appeal.
One effort to improve the quality of decision-making has been the
designation of certain higher-level courts to hear cases involving
administrative agency decisions regarding international trade in goods
and services or trade-related intellectual property rights. 15 During the
pre-WTO accession period, China had already taken steps to address
the poor quality of judges by requiring appointments based on merit
and experience. However, existing judges were exempt from these
qualification requirements. Since the overwhelming majority of
Chinese judges does not have any formal legal training, these efforts to
raise the professional caliber of the bench will be ineffective. There are
additional obstacles presented by other systemic and structural
problems, including rampant corruption, local protectionism, and Party
control of courts, police, and prosecutors through political legal
committees (zhengfa weiyuanwei) at every level.
A final area of structural reforms concerns uniform application
of laws. China has committed to implementing the WTO Agreements
in a uniform and consistent manner at the national, sub-national, and
13 Embassy of the People's Republic in the United States of America, at http://www.china-
embassy.org (July 30, 2002).
14 USTR REPORT, supra note 9.
15 Supreme People's Court rules issued August 2002, effective October 2002.
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local levels, and within the Special Economic Zones. It is also required
to establish an internal review mechanism to investigate and address
allegations of non-uniform application of laws reported by companies
or individuals. In implementing these commitments, China has
undertaken an extensive central government campaign to inform and
educate both central and local government officials and state-owned
enterprise ("SOE") managers regarding WTO rules and benefits. In
addition to national efforts, several provinces and municipalities have
also established WTO centers. An internal review mechanism to
handle cases of non-uniform application has been established under
MOFTEC's Department of WTO Affairs, but the actual workings are
not yet clear.
These extensive rule of law-related commitments to ensure
transparency, nondiscrimination, uniform application, and independent
judicial review affect not only the development of China's trade
regime, but also have implications for its overall legal reform efforts.
The effective implementation of WTO commitments is particularly
challenging in the face of the structural problems plaguing China's
developing legal system--corruption, local protectionism, lack of
adequately trained personnel, and the pervasive politicization and
Party control of decision-making by the courts, police, and
prosecutors.
Finally, let me conclude by reviewing some recent
developments and suggesting a thought experiment. The values and
core principles that are reflected in the GATT/WTO system include
transparency, accountability, non-discrimination (concerning the
treatment of foreign and domestic trading partners), and the rule of
law. Adherence to these values and principles is meant to promote
greater welfare maximization and commercial predictability, and
requires the balancing of national interests with the demands of an
open and fair global trading system.
However, until recently, the WTO system itself was a
secretive, closed, exclusively governmental process accessible only to
powerful sectors of the business community. Due primarily to
pressures from the NGO community, the WTO is now beginning to
open a small window into the labyrinth of its rules and processes. In an
effort to increase access to information and expand opportunities for
participation and input by a wider range of interested stakeholders, the
WTO has begun to invite NGOs to its symposia, accept NGO briefs in
WTO dispute resolution proceedings, convene meetings with NGOs,
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and has developed an NGO forum section on the WTO website. These
developments reflect changes (albeit still contested) regarding the roles
of NGOs within the trade arena, and demonstrate to NGOs the value of
targeting multilateral bodies in highly public ways and asserting
concrete demands for the inclusion of civil society stakeholders
outside of the business sector. The number of accredited NGO
observers at the Ministerial Meetings has also grown from a small
handful to thousands, in addition to the NGO briefings and activities.
In recent years, the case for normative and empirical
connections between trade and human rights has been advanced before
both international business and human rights communities. For
example, the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) has issued reports and recommendations regarding trade,
the environment, corporate responsibility, and the advancement of
human rights protections before various U.N. bodies and private sector
groups. 16 Amid a backdrop of rising concerns about the effects of
globalization, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan called on business
leaders to join an international initiative-the Global Compact-in an
address to The World Economic Forum on January 31, 1999. The idea
of the Global Compact was to bring companies together with U.N.
agencies, labor, NGOs and other civil-society actors to foster action
and partnerships in the pursuit of good corporate citizenship, also
referred to as "corporate responsibility," "sustainable growth," and the
"triple bottom line." 17 The high-level launch event at the U.N.
Headquarters in New York on July 26, 2000, brought together senior
executives from fifty major corporations and the leaders of labor,
human rights, environment, and development organizations. China
held its first meeting of Global Compact in China in December of
2002.
In a similar fashion, the lead-up to the 2008 Olympics and
China's WTO implementation efforts will provide an environment of
increased international scrutiny and attention that presents significant
opportunities for a wider range of actors (media, governments,
business, and NGOs) to develop more effective strategies to advance
human rights concerns in China. The present global trading system is
16 See Website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, at
http://www.unhchr.ch.
17 For a compilation of relevant international treaties, codes, multilateral, private sector, and NGOs
groups working on corporate responsibility issues in China, see Corporate Responsibility Resources
Guide, CHINA RIGHTS FORUM, Spring 2003.
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premised on the acceptance of liberal economic assumptions regarding
the "problem"-how to maximize aggregate economic welfare-and
the "solution"--markets functioning free from state interference. In
the pre-WTO accession debates, 18 one argument posed by supporters
of WTO accession for China suggested that economic liberalization
and its accompanying legal reforms would create or at least encourage
conditions conducive to more openness and political reform.
However, as WTO implementation obstacles have since made
clear, effective economic reform requires many of the same legal
protections called for by proponents of political and civil rights
reform. Rather than validating a causal connection between trade and
market liberalization followed by broader systemic reforms-or the
current Chinese bifurcation of political and economic reforms-it has
become clear that economic reforms actually travel in the same
development boat as reforms necessary to protect international human
rights.
Obstacles arising in the first year of China's WTO
implementation suggest significant overlap between the development
of China's new trade regime and a legal system that protects and
promotes human rights. Proponents of both economic reforms and the
protection of human rights point to structural and systemic problems in
the legal system, problems of rampant corruption, the politicization of
the decision-making processes due to the overarching role of the Party,
and the urgent task of constructing a transparent, impartial, and
independent legal system.
If we compare the economic, political, and legal reforms
necessary to develop China's domestic system to integrate into both
the global trade regime and the international human rights regime, we
can see a number of parallels that feature values of transparency and
the rule of law. The absence of independent and competent courts and
accountable administrative decision-making pose serious obstacles
both to the protection of individual freedoms and to the protection of
trading and investment rights.
Despite these similar values and goals, it belabors the obvious
to point out the differences in political will and effective
implementation of these two arenas of China's integration into the
global community. In accepting the trade-offs of global economic
integration and the extraordinary degree of international scrutiny and
18 Sharon K. Horn, Playing by Whose Rules: Global Trade and Human Rights, CHINA RIGHTS
FORUM, Spring 2000, at 22-28.
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accountability, the Chinese authorities clearly believed that they had
something to gain from economic reform. It is also clear they believe
they have a great deal to lose and fear from genuine political reforms.
However, consider the following record of China's
participation in the international human rights regime: Over the past
twenty years, China has voluntarily signed onto at least six core
international human rights instruments aimed at protecting the rights
of children, women, ethnic minorities, and other vulnerable groups.19
By signing and ratifying these key documents, China has agreed to
respect international standards and norms regarding freedom of
expression, freedom of association, rights to information, and
numerous other fundamental rights. China has also agreed to comply
with the self-reporting system and monitoring mechanisms set forth by
each instrument. Yet, as documented by Human Rights in China and
other NGOs and international bodies, the government remains
politically repressive and continues its crackdowns, executions, and
detentions of religious leaders, Internet activists, and individuals
peacefully voicing their criticisms of the government, or advocating
for democratic reforms. The economic and social disparities between
the coastal and interior areas, between Han and ethnic minorities, and
between urban and rural residents, continue to widen, threatening
stability and undermining the sustainability of any economic progress.
At the same time, consider the following aspects of China's
WTO commitments and compliance efforts: The state has agreed to
take on a pervasive and proactive role in advancing international trade
regime values and implementing structural and specific WTO
commitments through training, education, and legislative reforms,
including efforts to change a whole culture embedded in guanxi
(relationship) networks as the way of "doing business." In addition,
China is submitting itself to extensive and detailed foreign and
international scrutiny over the next ten or more years, providing
information in a timely and responsive way, allowing for foreign
review and input into legislative drafting processes, and agreeing to
'9 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1992); U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (1988); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1980); International Convention for Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (CERD) (1981); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (signed in 1997 and ratified in February 2001 with reservations on provisions regarding
independent unions); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (signed on October 5,
1998, and not yet ratified).
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greater scrutiny and even more rigorous commitments than
commitments of other WTO members.
Now, imagine if this were not about multilateral trade and
domestic economic reforms, but about the promotion of international
and domestic human rights and political reforms. Imagine if China
accepted and promoted human rights commitments with the same
degree of political will and institutional allocation of resources, and
willingness to attempt fundamental changes in the prevailing culture
and norms of "doing business."
At this point that may seem a naYve vision of what is possible.
But twenty years ago it was unthinkable that one of the world's
bastions of Communism would agree to undertake such radical
economic reform, or welcome "advanced productive forces" (Party-
speak for Capitalists) into the Communist Party. It is also important to
keep in mind that the Party and the government leaders are not as
monolithic as their united public front suggests. Just as reformers
within the Party advocated for the present economic reforms, there are
also voices within the Party aware of the benefits of political reforms,
including a reassessment of the June 4th crackdown. Most importantly,
despite on-going crackdowns and political repression, Chinese citizens
continue to press for a more open, fair, and democratic China. In the
international arena, pressure by NGOs on multilateral bodies such as
the WTO has opened up more opportunities for participation and input
into policy-making that crosses the doctrinal barriers among trade,
environment, labor rights, and human rights.
While recognizing the significant challenges facing China in
fully implementing its WTO obligations, the international business
community claims realistic expectations, but demands full WTO
compliance with the letter and the spirit of the trade regime's
obligations. The international human rights regime demands no less.
ADAM QI LI
After more than one decade of miraculous economic growth,
China is now facing some of the most difficult challenges any country
has ever encountered. In its accession to the WTO, China seems to
have agreed to more than it can deliver. Even without the WTO, the
Chinese government would already have had too much to deal with:
from overtaxed farmers to urban unemployment and from billions of
dollars of non-performing loans to the depressed stock market.
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Corruption is skyrocketing, and the environment is deteriorating. With
WTO membership, the challenges have become more monstrous.
This unbelievable transitional difficulty for China has become
more obvious to the West. It is only a matter of time before the U.S.
Congress will focus on how much China has delivered on its promises
and how much it has benefited Americans in trade. China, in turn,
could become more defensive, if either side of the Pacific does not
handle the disagreement properly. The human rights and Taiwan issues
could reinforce the distrust on both sides. If this becomes a pattern for
the future of the Sino-U.S. relationship, it will certainly harm the
interests of both sides.
Even if it is unavoidable that the China-U.S. relationship will
occasionally suffer from backlashes, the divide between the two
countries will likely not deepen. To accomplish greater bilateral
understanding, it is indispensable to acknowledge that the transitional
problems China faces are both fundamental and structural. These
problems are likely to make China a difficult case in its
implementation of WTO rules. China may miss some deadlines and
fail to implement some needed rules and regulations in a timely
manner. If this occurs, it is likely due to the fact that the Chinese
central government has become crippled by its own domestic politics,
and therefore is not able to push hard enough to enforce these rules,
rather than its being unwilling to do so. Many people working with
China's WTO teams have testified that China is working hard to meet
its commitments. Given the current situation in China, I would argue
that the implementation of WTO provisions is not a natural course.
However, China would be more likely to live up to its commitments
made in the WTO agreements if it could gradually build up the
capacity to match its promises. Such an undertaking is impossible
without strategic encouragement and engagement from the
international community, especially from the United States. The
United States should show strong leadership with acute insights, clear
focus, and determination in this task, as it once did in the post-war
reconstruction of Europe.
To start with, the United States should, first, support the overall
effort by China to comply with the WTO terms, rather than highlight
its possible noncompliance. Washington should work out incremental
plans with China on issues concerning both parties and mark early
successes. Second, the United States should recognize that WTO
implementation is a long journey that requires patience. It should be
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prepared to work on the foundations with China to ensure a smooth
transition to a market economy. Washington should also mobilize both
the business world and other concerned communities, both domestic
and international, to support building up the basics in China, including
an independent judicial system, a sound social safety net, and a healthy
fiscal, tax, and financial system. Third, the Bush Administration
should prioritize its targets in its relations with China, and pick the
right issues to focus on at one period, so as to avoid unnecessary
backfire on the United States and across the ocean. These efforts
should be made in concert with other members of the European Union
and the international community, including the United Nations and the
World Bank, to acquire both legitimacy and synergy.
While several offices under the current administration are
proactively working with China in the implementation process and
focusing on both incremental enforcement and building up capacities,
the Bush Administration sometimes departs from the traditional
strategic ambiguity on Taiwan affairs and positions itself as fighting a
new Cold War. By doing so, the United States risks its hard-earned
WTO advantages and the U.S.-China relationship. The recent
incidents, from President Bush's speech in Japan on his way to China,
vowing the United States would defend Taiwan, to mindless slips,
such as calling Taiwan the "Republic of Taiwan," all revealed a huge
policy reversal. The negative effects are already perceivable. President
Jiang Zemin openly visited Tehran in 2002. He was the first head of
state to visit Iran since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. His visit is an
open signal to the world that China does not buy the "Axis of Evil"
formula. This is not what the current administration wants to see, but is
at least partly the consequence of a series of American foreign policy
missteps regarding China. The United States should rethink its
strategies toward China now, before it is too late.
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